The Boston Red Sox season came to an embarrassing end in New York on Wednesday night as they were swept away by the New York Yankees in a series marred by an anemic offense and questionable bullpen management. 

In the fifth inning of Tuesday’s Game 1 loss, rookie manager Chad Tracy made the first big decision of his postseason managerial career, lifting Payton Tolle after 4.2 innings in which he allowed only one earned run on five hits on 83 pitches, so as not to allow New York slugger Ben Rice to see the rookie left-hander a third time. He turned to reliever Erik Miller and the move immediately backfired as Rice took the second pitch he saw 423 feet to dead center field, extending the New York lead to two at 2-0. 

Again in the fifth inning of Wednesday’s loss, Tracy made an even more aggressive decision, lifting 36-year-old veteran starter Sonny Gray after throwing only 73 pitches. He had allowed only one earned run on six hits in 4.2 innings. And again, Tracy turned to Miller, who again was unable to get the job done, allowing an RBI single to Cody Bellinger. 

In the wake of the sweep, those crucial bullpen decisions by Tracy took center stage in the Red Sox clubhouse as frustrated players dissected the series loss. 

Gray was incredibly outspoken about being pulled early: "I'm the best pitcher in the American League going through the order for a third time. I would've liked to live or die with me in that moment, but that's the competitor I am. You can probably ask the guys in here if they felt the same way,” Gray said. “I would’ve liked to be trusted in that moment,” he continued. 

After being told to ask “the guys” if they felt the same way, reporters went to All-Star first baseman Willson Contreras for his thoughts on the early hook, to which he motioned to lock his lips twice. He did, however, offer an interesting answer on the team's use of analytics, saying, "It's not enough when you have talent, or you have data, or you have computers telling you what to do, because this is baseball. The data is here to help us, but at the end of the day, you need experience and veteran guys to win games. There's a lot of stuff I would like to say, but I'll state it like that." 

When MassLive.com’s Chris Cotillo asked whether he believed the team was too focused on analytics, Contreras simply replied: “If you watch the game.” 

Given that both decisions were made in nearly identical situations, many assumed the calls to the pen weren’t Tracy’s alone, but a front-office call about how the game was supposed to go. But when you dig into the decisions, it’s not that simple. 

The decision to lift Tolle was almost certainly analytically based. In 2026, Rice hit .333/.421/.837/1.258 with 17 home runs off of four-seam fastballs, Tolle’s primary pitch. That's opposed to posting a line of .263/.349/.482/.831 against sinkers and .234/.340/.445/.785 against sliders, Miller’s specialities. 

You can bemoan the decision to lift a rolling Tolle all you want, but the decision, at least analytically, was a sound one. Ultimately, it falls on Miller for teeing up a center-cut cutter for Rice to lift off on. 

However, when deciding to lift Gray, the choice has almost no analytical backing. As the veteran noted in his postgame media availability, he was one of the best pitchers in the American League when facing the lineup a third time, with opponents hitting just .180/.235/.280/.515 in 162 plate appearances, meaning that sticking with Gray was the analytically sound decision. The choice becomes even more puzzling when you look at Bellinger’s numbers against sinkers and sliders. The 31-year-old hit .326/.413/.472/.885 against sinkers, and .288/.341/.588/.928 against sliders. 

Unlike in Game 1, Miller actually executed his pitch, burying a slider well below the zone, but the veteran Bellinger did a good job of getting the bat to the ball, making the results all the same. Ultimately, it feels fair to chalk up both decisions as a first-year manager making a mistake in his first taste of postseason action.  

Those are just two isolated situations, though. The organization is still heavily focused on the analytical side of the game, which, like most things, has benefits and flaws. One example of its flaws is the team’s approach with third baseman Caleb Durbin. After acquiring him from the Milwaukee Brewers, Boston wanted him to adjust his plate approach to focus more on pulling the ball in the air, which led to him being one of the worst qualified hitters in baseball for the first two months of the season. After consulting an outside hitting instructor, Durbin returned to his prior approach of trying to spray the ball all around the field and became one of the Red Sox most dependable bats. 

However, the analytics also showed the team that pitchers like Gray, who had an underwhelming 2025 campaign with the St. Louis Cardinals, could return to being a front-line starter. Or Tyron Guerrero, who hadn’t appeared in a big-league game since 2019, could be an effective back-end reliever. 

Year over year, the most successful teams in baseball are those that embrace analytics: the Brewers, the Tampa Bay Rays, and the Los Angeles Dodgers. However, as Contreras notes, there has to be a blend of using analytics and having a feel for the human nature of the game. In pulling Tolle, the decision was analytically sound but lacked feel. The decision to lift Gray lacked both. 

The Dodgers are the gold standard in baseball for many reasons, but their ability to blend both analytics and a feel for the game is among the most important. 

Breslow’s heavy use of analytics certainly has its flaws, especially on the hitting side, where the third-year CBO underestimated the value of the long ball. But saying the team is over-reliant on what the computer says feels reactionary after a disappointing playoff result.