Let’s not sugarcoat this: Crystal Palace have the worst defensive record – both in actual goals and expected goals (xG) – after four Premier League matches. Given recent losses in the back line, it is easy to think that the issue exists solely with central defense. However, while Palace did lose Maxence Lacroix with no true replacement, scapegoating central defense alone would be considered “low hanging fruit.” While the back line isn’t without guilt, the true issue is with adjusting to a new system, with central midfield being the most important cog in the machine.

Under Oliver Glasner, Crystal Palace played in a 3421 shape reminiscent to the shape Pierre Sage deploys – on paper. However, in practice, the methods of these two shapes are quite dissimilar out of possession. Glasner’s iteration sat deeper – ranking 16th in average defensive action height in 2025/26 – and played in closer relation to each other. Borrowing principles from the famed catenaccio system, players maintained spacing and moved in unison as someone stepped up to close down the ball. Close spatial relationships were maintained, which necessitated wingbacks playing deeper in defensive phases, often forming a “true” back line of five.

Under Sage, aggressive counterpressing is preferred over organized low blocks. His Lens side ranked 7th in average defensive height in 2025/26 and were far more active in tackles and duels. In his system, wingbacks play a more pivotal role in attack and are therefore further up the pitch in-possession. Rather than maintaining the same spatial relationships as they defend, players depend more heavily on player rotations and awareness to occupy vacated space and prevent opportunities.

Crystal Palace have conceded a league-high 164 box touches in their first four Premier League matches. While this has certainly led to a higher likelihood of goals conceded, it is a symptom of a bigger issue and not the culprit itself. Therefore, the question is simple: “What is the main culprit?”

It is very tempting to pin this on Pierre Sage’s aggressive out-of-possession tactics, but what do the numbers show?

Early in the season, Crystal Palace have attempted (and won) the most tackles in the Premier League, with the second-highest success rate. Additionally, Palace rank second in ground duel win-rate and have committed the second-fewest fouls in the Premier League. All these metrics point to a side that is effective in their aggression. Palace are attempting and producing tackles at the league’s highest volume without sacrificing efficiency. However, in a system built around high-volume defensive aggression, missed tackles become inevitable. Therefore, the issue may not be the player who steps forward to make the challenge, but rather the framework that exists behind him when he does.

For aggressive play to be successful, there must exist safeguards behind it to protect against errors. In Pierre Sage’s system, these safeguards exist in midfield, and their lack of execution is the main culprit behind Crystal Palace’s early defensive woes. Midfielders need to read the situation and react accordingly to protect the back line. This isn’t as simple as adhering to one instruction, as different phases of play require different reactions and responsibilities.

Early Build Up 

With wingbacks pushing high early, it is paramount that the central midfield duo initially maintains its deeper positioning rather than prematurely advancing into the attacking third. Doing so will keep five players in true “rest defense” and the additional numbers provide protection against swift counters that may arise from an errant pass or turnover. Crystal Palace supporters saw exactly why this structure is so important in Fulham’s first goal at Craven Cottage. A poor pass from Jaydee Canvot could have been mitigated had both Palace midfielders stayed back in early build. Instead, Quinten Timber was too aggressive with his advancement, leaving Adam Wharton as the only screen in front of the back three. Canvot’s error created the problem, but Palace’s midfield positioning magnified it – leaving fewer safeguards in place once possession was lost.

Immediately After Possession Loss

 When Crystal Palace lose possession, Pierre Sage wants his side to aggressively close down and win the ball back. In these moments, the midfield splits into two roles: a vertical counterpresser and a horizontal shield. The counterpresser advances and looks to immediately win possession back and quickly create opportunities to score against an unsettled back line. The shield remains deeper, cutting off central access to opposing strikers and 10’s while shuttling laterally as needed to cover gaps.

Sustained Defending: Protection When Stepping Out

 Even when dropping deep against sustained possession, Crystal Palace will look to remain aggressive and close down opponents when the opportunity arises. The exact method will vary slightly depending on who steps out, but the responsibilities are similar: the ball-side central midfielder occupies the half-space while the back-side central midfielder protects central areas and uses his cover shadow to deny a switch to the far side.

When the wingback steps up, the ball-side central midfielder maintains a higher depth than the outside central defender, who will shift over toward the touchline. If the wingback AND central defender step, the central midfielder still shifts laterally, but his depth changes. In these scenarios, the midfielder will drop deeper to occupy the space vacated by the pressing central defender. In both instances, the back-side central midfielder’s job remains unchanged. He will deny access to central areas and use his cover shadow to cut off a switch until his wingback has recovered to the back line.

Fulham’s second goal against Crystal Palace showed what can happen when these protections do not exist. Palace were organized in a midblock when Anan Khalaili stepped out with Chris Richards following suit. Richards was beaten and dribbled past. When the system is functioning properly, the ball-side midfielder would drop behind Richards and occupy the defensive half-space. Instead, that midfielder, Quentin Timber, gave a poor effort to track back, causing a “domino effect” where the back three needed to shift over more aggressively than intended. To make matters worse, Adam Wharton did not properly protect the central area of the pitch and allowed for a trailing Fulham runner to slot a rebounded effort into the back of the net.

Recognition Before Reaction

With varied responsibilities across different phases of play, proper execution requires not only physical and technical ability, but also spatial awareness and recognition. The latter will take time – and repetition – to master, and perhaps no Crystal Palace player illustrates this need for an adjustment period better than Adam Wharton. Wharton has not suddenly lost the qualities that have made him an invaluable member of Palace’s midfield since 2024. Rather, he is being asked to apply these qualities into a new system and is learning how to quickly recognize which responsibility each scenario requires. Under Glasner, Wharton’s responsibilities didn’t change much: stay in close proximity and move in unison out of possession, receive and play incisive balls forward. Under Sage, his role is more nuanced. With more time and repetitions, he should begin to flourish and show consistent signs of the great midfielder we’ve known him to be in SE25.

The cracks in the Crystal Palace defense, while frustrating, cannot simply be blamed on Pierre Sage’s system – nor can they be blamed solely on the quality of Palace’s back three. The aggressive tendencies have yielded efficient results in tackling and ground duels and have generated quality chances in attack. Instead of eliminating the system and starting from scratch, Sage must continue to instill his tactical regimen into his team – something that will require time to gel. Just as Palace supporters gave time to the previous manager, they must show patience with Pierre Sage. After all, had Oliver Glasner been given a short leash, Crystal Palace may not have experienced its most successful seasons – and first pieces of silverware – in club history. The answer to Palace’s problems is not necessarily less aggression, but better understanding of the framework that makes this aggression sustainable. The system will take time, but Sage’s track record provides plenty of reason to be optimistic that this patience will ultimately be rewarded.