Pierre Sage turned RC Lens into a formidable unit in the 2025/26 season – during which his side conceded the second-fewest goals and fourth-fewest expected goals in league play – and utilized an effective structure to win the Coupe de France for the first time in the club’s 120-year history. Two principles formed the foundation of that success: attacking wingback play and an aggressive high press/counterpress by a central midfielder.

Now, five months removed from his monumental cup victory, Pierre Sage is struggling to achieve the same defensive solidity at Crystal Palace. Calls for a shift to a back-four structure are gaining momentum with Palace supporters, but a formation change alone would not resolve all underlying issues. There are changes that must be made, but there is reason to believe that Palace’s defensive issues stem less from tactical setup and more from execution of the system’s core principles. Sage’s previous work in France suggests the possible fix: control where the opposition plays out from.

Attacking Wingbacks & Intense Counterpressing: Non-Negotiables

Expansive wingback play is pivotal to Pierre Sage’s tactical philosophy. By pushing high and controlling wide areas in the attacking third, wingbacks allow wingers/attacking midfielders in the front three to drift into the half-spaces and create goalscoring opportunities. Whether looking at “actual” or “expected” goal contributions, Lens’ wingbacks were highly involved in their attack, recording 15% of club G+A numbers in Ligue 1 & 19% of combined xG+xA.

Additionally, Sage’s system at Lens used high regains to win back possession in advanced areas and threaten goal. Lens ranked third in Ligue 1 for possession won in the final third and first in possession won in midfield, demonstrating a side that did not sit back in a low block and wait for an opportunity to counter. Instead, they looked to win the ball back quickly and attack unsettled back lines, leading to a goal return that ranked second in Ligue 1.

Potential Pitfall: Four in "Rest-Defense"

When both wingbacks join the forward line and, in turn, are joined by a midfielder in the counterpress, it adds up to six players in the attacking third – leaving just four back in “rest-defense” to protect against transitions. With these principles ingrained into Sage’s philosophy, the call to change to a back four would not address the vulnerability in transitions. Regardless of a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3/4-5-1 base, attacking wingbacks and a high counterpressing midfielder will still result in four in rest-defense.

Considering the success of Sage’s principles in France, there is reason to believe that Palace’s defensive issues may stem more from the system’s implementation than from the structure itself. Recent comments from Palace wingback Tyrick Mitchell seem to support this assessment. Speaking on the Eagles’ defensive woes, Mitchell said:

These words are telling in that they do not seem indicative of a squad who has lost faith in their manager’s tactical approach. Rather, they strongly suggest that the players see the bigger picture and admit that they are taking responsibility for the club’s shortcomings. The main question, in turn, becomes a simple one: “If Sage’s principles remain the same, what has changed in their execution?”

Johan Cruyff, widely regarded as one of the most brilliant football minds of his generation, spoke on the importance of manipulating available space during a match:

Cruyff further clarified this notion, stating:

These quotes perfectly explain the current defensive issues at Crystal Palace. It is not that Palace are necessarily committing excessive numbers forward, but rather how they are pushing up and pressing the opponent. The main culprit is exactly what Johan Cruyff alluded to in his philosophy: Palace are not making the pitch small when out of possession.

In matches against Nottingham Forest and Brighton, Crystal Palace deployed a very narrow press consisting of five players: the front three and the central midfield duo. Narrow pressure cuts off central progression, but does not wall off either flank, allowing opponents to freely pick which side to attack down. This led to Forest and Brighton easily bypassing the high press by going wide. As the Palace wingbacks stayed high, wide areas were consistently exposed, creating numerical advantages for the opposition. Forest and Brighton took full advantage of this, both initiating 38% of their attacks down the left flank (far above their season averages to date). 

Going back to Cruyff’s quotes, Palace’s fatal flaw in these situations was not limiting the space that their opponents could use. Rather than cutting off half the pitch and efficiently overloading one flank to apply pressure, they allowed their opponents the entire pitch, making it easier to progress the ball and create chances. This simply was not the case during Sage’s time at RC Lens. Sage’s Lens side routinely set up their press in a way that allowed for one flank to be safely overloaded, create havoc, and protect the rest-defense. This all started with their striker – usually former Palace man Odsonne Edouard. Edouard was instructed to make curving runs toward the opposing goalkeeper – restricting access to most of the pitch and forcing a pass down one flank. This simple strategy provided multiple benefits. First, by focusing on a smaller area, it puts players in closer proximity to each other, making it more difficult to pass through the press or switch play to the opposite flank. Second, it effectively “frees up” the opposite flank. The weak-side wingback is able to track back and join the back line. The weak-side winger/attacking midfielder can help to provide cover in central midfield while one of the midfield pair pushes into his counterpressing role. On paper, the 3-2-5 (or even 3-1-6) attacking shape holds true in possession, but proper coordination and rotations substantially reduce numerical disadvantages that occur during transitions.

Crystal Palace have kept a clean sheet once in the Premier League this season – away to Leeds United. It is no coincidence that this match showcased the cleanest example of making the pitch “as small as possible” when out of possession. Play was often shuttled to Palace’s left flank – a familiar tactic of Sage’s while at Lens. This allowed Anan Khalaili time to track back into his defensive line while also giving Daichi Kamada the freedom to protect against switches and/or step centrally to cover for counterpressing midfielder Quinten Timber. The tactics did not change. Rather, these tactics were made more effective by properly directing buildup to a smaller – and predictable – area on the pitch.

Crystal Palace's choice to name Pierre Sage as the successor to Oliver Glasner was a sound one, as the two share similarities in shape, structure, and philosophy. However, Pierre Sage is not Oliver Glasner and his system is certainly not identical to his predecessor's in SE25. Changes in tactical systems - even when nuanced - require time and repetition to master. One must remember, though, that this is a results-based business and responsibility for tactical execution is shared between players and manager. Pierre Sage has shown his ideas can bring success, but he must find a way to implement these changes effectively in a new league. Considering Sage's tactical flexibility was a big reason for his hire, one can remain optimistic that he will find a way for his system to work.