The Tactical Changes That Led to Arne Slot's Downfall

30th May 2026 marked the last day of Arne Slot’s tenure as Liverpool Football Club head coach.

In his two years in charge, the Dutchman famously led the Reds to their 20th league title, having taken over from the much-loved Jurgen Klopp.

Fans universally praised Slot after his impressive first season, so the drastic tactical changes in the second season became the defining issue of his tenure—and the key question to understand his legacy.

In his first interviews with Sky Sports, Slot was very open that a key reason he got the job as Liverpool’s first Head Coach was that his playing style was very similar to his predecessor, but with a slight decrease in risk when playing the final ball. Slot probably downplayed that a bit, but overall, he was right.

The essence of free-flowing attacking football was the Dutchman’s philosophy, and year one was very much a continuation of his tactics during his reign at Feyenoord.

So, if we think back to the 2024/25 season, the core areas to concentrate on were the adaptations made to the full-backs, the midfield three, and the roles of the front three. We’ve mentioned the lower risk on the final ball, and that was most impactful on Trent in Slot’s first season in charge, with the now Real Madrid full-back losing a bit of creativity with eight assists across the campaign, compared to 19 in his peak.

On the other side, Andy Robertson was taking up the David Hancko role as a defensively minded left-back, who would play quite narrow and deep rather than all-out attack as had been his style since joining in 2016.

The biggest beneficiary of Slot’s appointment was Ryan Gravenberch, who adopted the number 6 role following the failed transfer of Martin Zubimendi. Slot was very vocal; he wanted a central defensive midfielder who was tidy on the ball and could operate in tight spaces.

Enter the infamous Gravenberch half turn. For his central midfield partners, Alexis MacAllister and Dominik Szoboszlai, MacAllister picked up the left-sided role that would see him connect the play between midfield and attack, feeding the likes of Luis Diaz and Mohamed Salah quickly, and pressing higher up the pitch.

For Dominik Szoboszlai, his role in Slot’s first season was criminally underrated, doing all the hard yards, acting as the engine for not just the midfield, but the entire right side, offering Salah more space to utilise attacking spaces, and allowing Trent to over- and underlap when needed.

READ MORE: Andoni Iraola to Liverpool: David Ornstein Reports Verbal Agreement Reached

Salah had that space, as well as the license to press from the front in the first season, picking the ball up high up the pitch, with willing runners beyond and from deep, if you think about Slot’s first game at Ipswich and Salah’s assist for Diogo Jota.

Diaz would give Slot his preferred winger approach with more speed and trickery, but Salah’s genius last season offered extra freedom to Diaz and Gakpo, who could adapt inverted goal-scoring positions when needed, especially with the selflessness of the likes of Jota playing as Liverpool’s 9.

This sets up the central question: why did Slot’s approach shift so dramatically in 2025/26, and how did this impact Liverpool’s fortunes?

The obvious heartbreak of Diogo Jota should never ever be downplayed, but Slot also majorly changed his tactical set-up from what had previously brought him so much success. Out went Heitenga, in came Van Bronkhorst, and a major list of player ins and outs, which were exciting at the time, but naïve in hindsight.

Richard Hughes’ role in this rebuild shouldn’t be overlooked, because if you consider the previous Slot style of more conservative full backs to Jurgen Klopp, especially on the right, Liverpool moved to a pairing of Kerkez and Frimpong, both full throttle attack first, defend second mindset.

That can be deemed exciting if Gravenberch was able to perform as well in season two, and he did in season one in the six, but the most shocking change in Slot’s second season was the adaptation of Gravenberch’s role, taking him out of the six and playing him alongside MacAllister in the eight.

What did that mean? Two attacking full-backs, no coverage in midfield, Virgil and Ibou regularly isolated. If you consider the Nottingham Forest demolition and the major issues in the first half of the season, when we have the ball, it’s fine; when we don’t, it’s a long ball into the channels, and you’re one-on-one.

That shift also created more issues with the fact that the acquisition of Florian Wirtz eliminated Szoboszlai’s workhorse role. So now you’ve created MAJOR gaps and started your players higher up, creating huge issues when tracking back.

Wirtz was arguably the most exciting transfer in world football last summer. Slot’s idea was to play Wirtz high up the pitch to feed world-class strikers of Ekitike and Isak, but to do that, you needed to play a high-press setup. If you research Wirtz's positioning at Leverkusen, Slot did adapt his team to suit the German playmaker, dropping the LW position 10/15 yards deeper to allow Flo to optimise the left side of the pitch to roam into.

With Gakpo being the first choice LW after the sale of Diaz, that didn’t and would never work. Gakpo has a long list of excellent attributes, but carrying the ball from deep areas and being dynamic aren’t on that list.

If you do the same research on Ekitike and Isak, both strikers predominantly made their attacking runs into that left channel for Frankfurt and Newcastle, respectively, so Slot’s plan was to attack from the left with world-class recruits.

So, where did this leave Salah?

Without the cover from Szoboszlai, the option of Trent, as well as the new game plan of no press. Salah often looked like a man who was isolated and was expected to create moments of magic to get into the game.

The biggest issue? Zero Press.

This season’s Liverpool team was a strange sight for most fans, who have always been used to hard-working, high-energy. Even if the quality wasn’t always there, the work rate was.

This season, that simply wasn’t there.

Arne’s tactics may have worked with a high-press mentality, as collecting the ball higher up the pitch may have created more chances, gaps, and success. But you can’t have one without the other.

As results turned in October and November, Slot became the defensive manager who relied on set-piece goals, which he would have hated a year before. The defensive plan?

Same shape, just drop everyone deeper. This only isolated the forward line more. Gakpo would still get the ball in his deeper position, but with still no press from the front. Ekitike, Isak, and Salah would be tactically carved out of the game.

Arne, towards the end, looked lost, devoid of new ideas, unable to find the answers after his master plan went south. In fairness to the Dutchman, it was clear to see for everyone except Richard Hughes and Michael Edwards, and as time went on, blame moved from the former Feyenoord manager to the people above him.

I saw this because the fans started to regretfully discuss after the Nottingham Forest game in November that it may have been time for a replacement. As the season went on, it went from poor management to negligence from Hughes and Edwards.

The right decision has been made, but Arne Slot should be remembered for his first season, and the class shown in the aftermath of the devastation of Diogo Jota’s death.

While his second season was horrendous, his first was heroic. Best of luck, Arne.

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