I love data. It helps create structure to any argument. But finally putting this into an article versus tweeting against some of the opinions I have been seeing as of late.

Scott Harris has made mistakes. The Tigers’ 2026 record is disappointing. Their bullpen construction deserves scrutiny, several free-agent investments have failed and trading Tarik Skubal and Casey Mize dramatically raises the stakes for what comes next. But none of that means Detroit has spent the last four years going nowhere.

There is a difference between being frustrated with the Detroit Tigers and accurately evaluating the Detroit Tigers.

Right now, frustration is understandable.

The Tigers entered Aug. 24 at 61-69, fourth in the American League Central and 3 1/2 games out of the final wild-card spot. They had lost five straight and eight of their previous 10. That is not good enough, which is pretty obvious. 

Scott Harris deserves criticism for parts of the roster he constructed. The bullpen has repeatedly failed in high-leverage situations. Some of his free-agent investments have provided little return. Detroit has often been better at finding complementary players than acquiring established impact talent.

And after Harris traded Tarik Skubal and Casey Mize at the deadline, the argument that Detroit is still simply accumulating talent has an expiration date.

But another argument has become increasingly common around the Tigers: that the organization itself is horrible, Harris has accomplished essentially nothing and Detroit is once again asking fans to wait indefinitely on prospects.

That argument does not hold up nearly as well when you examine the entire record.

Earlier this month, My podcast partner Chris Brown attempted to quantify something that often gets lost in front-office arguments.

Instead of merely comparing win-loss records, Brown calculated the Baseball-Reference WAR produced by players acquired during the first four Tigers seasons under Dave Dombrowski, Al Avila and Harris.

Brown’s calculation credited:

That number should not be used to declare Harris superior to Dombrowski.

Brown himself made that qualification clear. Every baseball executive inherits a different organization, different payroll circumstances, different existing talent and a different competitive window.

But the Harris total does challenge the idea that his front office has spent four years adding nothing.

Brown broke Harris’ 35.7 WAR down this way:

Free agents: 11.4 bWAR

Waiver claims: 10.6

Trades: 7.4

Drafted players: 6.3

Only 6.3 WAR came from the draft.

Nearly 30 WAR came from free agents, trades and waiver claims.

That is important because one of the most repeated criticisms of Harris is that the Tigers have done little besides draft highly rated prospects and wait.

Brown’s numbers suggest something considerably broader has happened.

And the waiver number might be the most revealing figure in the entire exercise.

Getting 10.6 WAR from waiver claims does not happen because an organization had a top-three draft pick. It requires identifying players other organizations were willing to expose and finding ways to make them useful.

Tyler Holton is the obvious example. Detroit claimed him from Arizona in February 2023 and turned him into an important part of its pitching staff.

Andy Ibáñez was another early waiver claim who became a useful major-league role player and eventually delivered one of the biggest hits of Detroit’s 2024 postseason run.

That is not superstar acquisition. It is organizational competence. There is an important caveat with Brown’s tweet. WAR accumulated by an acquisition is not a comprehensive front-office grade. It does not account for acquisition cost, payroll efficiency, postseason success, long-term contractual risk or the future value of prospects.

It also should not allow Harris to claim players he did not acquire.

Tarik Skubal, Riley Greene, Colt Keith, Dillon Dingler and Jackson Jobe were already Tigers properties before Harris arrived.

Acquisition credit belongs to the previous regime.

The development environment those players entered after Harris took over can be discussed separately.

That distinction matters. The point of Brown’s research is not that Harris has outperformed Dombrowski.

The point is much narrower. If the argument is that Scott Harris has spent four years, adding almost nothing of value to the Detroit Tigers, 35.7 WAR of acquired production presents a serious problem for that argument.

Detroit finished 66-96 in 2022.

The Tigers had not reached the postseason since 2014.

From 2019 through 2022, Detroit went:

2019: 47-114

2020: 23-35

2021: 77-85

2022: 66-96

Combined, that is 213-330, a .392 winning percentage.

Since Harris’ first season:

2023: 78-84

2024: 86-76

2025: 87-75

2026 through Aug. 23: 61-69

Combined, Detroit is 312-304, a .506 team.

Going from .392 baseball during the previous four seasons to .506 under Harris represents roughly an 18-win improvement over a 162-game schedule.

Detroit also reached the postseason in both 2024 and 2025.

That does not excuse 2026. It does make the description “historically bad and inconsistent every year” difficult to defend. The Tigers have unquestionably been better.

The question now is whether “better” is enough.

This is where the conversation should become more uncomfortable for Harris.

His free-agent record is not good enough to simply point at the 11.4 WAR in Brown’s table and declare victory.

There have been successes. Tyler Holton, a waiver claim, as an example. There have also been expensive failures. Let's take a look.

The clearest miss is Kenta Maeda. Detroit signed Maeda for two years and $24 million before the 2024 season, hoping he would stabilize the rotation.

Instead, Maeda posted a 6.09 ERA in 2024, lost his rotation spot and was eventually designated for assignment in May 2025 while guaranteed money remained on his contract.

There is no need to dress that transaction up as process. It failed.

The original Jack Flaherty signing was almost the opposite.

Detroit signed Flaherty for one year and $14 million before 2024. In 18 Tigers starts he produced a 2.95 ERA. Detroit, then traded him to the Dodgers for Thayron Liranzo and Trey Sweeney.

That is exactly how a short-term free-agent signing can benefit a rebuilding organization twice.

First, the player helps the major-league club. Then, if circumstances dictate, the club converts that player into young organizational talent. It hasn't turned into big league talent as of yet so it remains to be seen. 

Flaherty’s second Tigers contract deserves to be evaluated separately, especially given his 2026 performance, but the first transaction was unquestionably one of Harris’ better moves.

Gleyber Torres also worked. Detroit signed Torres for one year and $15 million before the 2025 season after a down year with New York.

He responded with a .358 on-base percentage and 2.9 Baseball-Reference WAR, made the All-Star team and returned for 2026 after accepting Detroit’s qualifying offer.

Again, that is legitimate major-league value acquired through free agency.

Then there is Framber Valdez.

Valdez is important because his contract undercuts the idea that Harris simply refuses to spend money.

Detroit signed him for three years and $115 million before this season.

That was a significant commitment to a proven starting pitcher.

Through Aug. 23, however, Valdez was 8-8 with a 4.35 ERA in 138 2/3 innings.

Baseball-Reference credited him with roughly 1.1 WAR at that point.

For a pitcher earning more than $38 million annually on average, that is below expectations.

It is too early to call a three-year contract a failure after five months.

It is completely reasonable to say Year One has not delivered the impact Detroit expected. That gets closer to the real criticism of Harris.

It is not that every free agent he signs fails.

Flaherty and Torres alone make that argument false.

The issue is that Detroit has often been more successful finding short-term value than adding sustained, star-level outside production.

And some of the veterans brought in specifically to stabilize weak areas have not done so, out of the bullpen and in the trades he made last season. 

Then there is the part of the argument that gets dismissed too casually.

Farm systems matter. They are not championships. They are not playoff victories. They did help build the core of the 1984 World Series team and the 1987 team that lost in the ALCS. 

Eventually prospects must become major-league production. But if we are evaluating whether an organization is healthy or dysfunctional, amateur scouting and player development are absolutely part of that evaluation.

And Detroit’s improvement is dramatic.

MLB Pipeline ranked the Tigers:

25th entering 2023

13th at midseason 2023

5th entering 2024

6th at midseason 2024

No. 1 entering 2025

6th at midseason 2025

5th entering 2026

8th in August 2026 That means the Tigers went from one of baseball’s bottom-tier systems to spending multiple years among the sport’s better organizations for young talent.

Baseball America reached a similar conclusion.

Detroit ranked:

5th in 2024

2nd in 2025

4th entering 2026

Baseball America specifically noted that Detroit had produced three consecutive top-five systems. That is not meaningless.

And it cannot all be dismissed as the product of losing enough games to draft high.

Max Clark becoming one of baseball’s top prospects is meaningful, but Clark was the No. 3 overall pick. Great things should be expected from that draft position.

Kevin McGonigle is a different example.

McGonigle was selected later in the 2023 draft and developed into one of the best prospects in baseball before reaching Detroit.

That tells us more about scouting and development than simply selecting an obvious top-three talent.

Thayron Liranzo provides another example. Detroit did not draft him.

The Tigers acquired him in the Flaherty deal, and he subsequently climbed into Top 100 prospect territory. Those are different acquisition paths producing talent. Granted, no one wins titles on prospect rankings, but I digress. 

Then there are players inherited from Avila’s organization. Harris did not draft Dillon Dingler. He did not draft Colt Keith. He did not acquire Riley Greene. He did not acquire Jackson Jobe.

But when evaluating player development, it is reasonable to ask whether those players improved after the organizational infrastructure changed.

Both regimes can receive appropriate credit.

Baseball America’s evaluation of Detroit’s development operation in 2025 pointed to advancement from players including McGonigle, Clark, Josue Briceño, Liranzo, Dingler, Troy Melton and Max Anderson.

Its Statcast-based minor-league study also ranked Detroit particularly well in swing-decision development. That is an organizational philosophy showing up in players.

It still has to translate into enough major-league wins. But pretending it does not exist is dumb. 

If the farm system represents one of Harris’ strongest accomplishments, the 2026 bullpen represents one of the strongest criticisms.

Through Aug. 19, Detroit had suffered an MLB-high 19 losses in games it led in the seventh inning or later.

The Tigers were 12-22 in one-run games at that point.

That is a dramatic reversal from the previous two seasons, when Detroit went a combined 52-36 in one-run games.

Not every blown lead is a front-office failure. Relief pitching is volatile. Pitchers get hurt.

Players underperform. But when an identifiable roster weakness repeatedly costs games, roster construction has to enter the discussion. 

FanGraphs noted that Detroit’s bullpen had already fallen to 24th in FIP in 2025.

The warning signs existed. Harris did try to address the back end by signing Kenley Jansen.

The result still has not been good enough. Jansen has seen better days.  That is the distinction worth making. The front office did not completely ignore the bullpen.

The front office failed to build enough reliable depth behind its preferred late-inning options. Harris owned he didn't add enough depth in the trade deadline presser.Those are different criticisms.

The second one is fair.

Everything changed at this year’s trade deadline.

Detroit traded Tarik Skubal to Los Angeles.

Skubal was a two-time reigning Cy Young Award winner and had a 2.79 ERA with 116 strikeouts in 96 2/3 innings before the deal.

In return, Detroit received Zyhir Hope, River Ryan and Brady Smith.

Hope immediately became one of the best prospects in Detroit’s system and was ranked among MLB Pipeline’s top 30 prospects in baseball.

Ryan was another Top 100 talent, although his injury history adds obvious risk.

Smith added another high-upside pitching prospect.

Detroit then traded Casey Mize and Gage Workman to San Diego for Kash Mayfield and Jackson Wolf.

Mize had been a 2025 All-Star and had a 2.70 ERA through 16 starts in 2026.

Mayfield was one of San Diego’s best prospects.

Those moves dramatically increased Detroit’s farm depth again.

MLB Pipeline wrote this month that arguably no organization received a larger infusion of high-end talent through the draft and trade deadline than Detroit.

Half of Detroit’s newly updated top 10 prospects were not even in the organization at the beginning of July.

The Tigers now have five players in MLB Pipeline’s Top 100:

Max Clark, No. 13

Zyhir Hope, No. 28

Bryce Rainer, No. 48

River Ryan, No. 66

Josue Briceño, No. 69

That is an impressive collection of talent.

It also creates pressure.

Harris no longer gets to be evaluated primarily on whether he improved the farm system. He did.

Now comes the harder part.

The purpose of a great farm system is eventually to stop talking about how great the farm system is. Prospects have to graduate. Some have become quality major leaguers. Others need to become trade currency. That is where the Harris era stands now.

Max Clark has reached Detroit.

Kevin McGonigle has reached Detroit.

Dillon Dingler has become a major-league catcher.

Colt Keith is established. Riley Greene is established. Jackson Jobe has returned.

Detroit still has Hope, Rainer, Ryan, Briceño, Mayfield, Brady Smith and others behind them.

The organization has accumulated enough talent. Now the standard changes.

Detroit cannot continue entering seasons with obvious holes and simply expect player development to compensate for all of them. Spending wisely needs to happen. Letting go of the prospects that teams may have interest in. 

That is especially true after trading Skubal. The Tigers gave up the most valuable individual player in their organization.

Maybe that trade eventually looks brilliant.

Maybe Hope becomes a star.

Maybe Ryan becomes a front-line starter.

Maybe Smith develops.

Or maybe the Tigers eventually use that talent to acquire established major-league players.

But prospect rankings are no longer sufficient justification. The return needs to become wins.

This is the part of the conversation I simply do not understand.

You can criticize Scott Harris. You can criticize A.J. Hinch. You can be angry about a 61-69 record, the bullpen, the free-agent misses and the fact that this roster still has obvious holes. I have criticized those things myself.

But jumping from that to “Harris has to go,” “Hinch has to go” or “this organization is garbage” is mind-blowing when you consider what Detroit has actually accomplished over the previous two seasons and where this organization was not that long ago.

The Tigers reached the postseason in 2024 and 2025.

Before that, Detroit had not played postseason baseball since 2014.

It does not give Harris or Hinch lifetime immunity from criticism. It does not make 2026 acceptable. But it should provide some perspective when evaluating whether the entire operation needs to be blown up.

I write about this organization. I watch the major-league club. I watch the minor leagues. I watch the players coming through Toledo, Erie, West Michigan and Lakeland. What I see is not a perfect organization. I see an organization that has substantially more talent than it did four years ago and now has the much harder task of determining how all of those pieces fit together. That is where Harris deserves to be judged next.

This offseason is not simply about adding another prospect or celebrating another high farm-system ranking.

Detroit has real 40-man roster decisions coming.

Who belongs?

Who doesn't?

Which young players are legitimate parts of the next winning Tigers team?

Which prospects need protection?

Which veterans have reached the end of their usefulness?

Which players have value but are redundant?

Where can Detroit trade from organizational depth to acquire major-league certainty?

And, perhaps most importantly, where does Harris finally need to supplement the young core with better outside talent?

That is the next phase of this project.

And Harris knows it. The Tigers have accumulated enough young talent that some difficult decisions are inevitable. There will not be room for everyone. Max Clark and Kevin McGonigle are already in Detroit. Colt Keith and Dillon Dingler are established major leaguers.

Riley Greene remains a centerpiece. Jackson Jobe is part of the pitching picture. Behind them are players such as Zyhir Hope, Bryce Rainer, Josue Briceño, River Ryan, Kash Mayfield, Brady Smith and others who either need eventual major-league opportunities or become potential trade capital.

The Tigers cannot simply keep every prospect and wait. Some of this inventory has to become the next version of the major-league roster. That is why I believe Harris should be judged heavily on what happens next.

Does he identify the right players to keep? He will have to come this off-season. 

Does he move the right players?

Does he address the bullpen?

Does he add another legitimate bat?

Does he improve the defense?

Does he create a roster that is not so dependent on everything going right simultaneously?

Those are fair questions.

And if the answers are still stuck in a stalemate, then the conversation about Harris becomes different.

But there is something else Tigers fans should remember before declaring the entire operation a failure.

It was not very long ago that Brandon Dixon led the Detroit Tigers in home runs.

Dixon hit 15 home runs in 2019. Fifteen. That led the team. Detroit went 47-114 that season.

That was not a developmental transition happening around a competitive major-league core. That was one of the worst teams in franchise history.

So when I hear people talk as though the current Tigers are somehow indistinguishable from the darkest years of the previous rebuild, I simply cannot get there.

Do you want to go back to that?

Be my guest. I don't. I sat through a lot of bad baseball in my youth in the 90's where the team didn't spend anything.  Detroit is not where it needs to be. But there is an enormous difference between a flawed team coming off consecutive postseason appearances and an organization whose leading home-run hitter finished with 15 while the club lost 114 games.

There is another extreme worth avoiding. Nobody should treat Harris or Hinch as untouchable because Detroit reached the playoffs twice. Harris' free-agent record deserves scrutiny. The bullpen construction deserves scrutiny. There have been too many short-term solutions and not enough permanent ones.

The major-league roster still lacks enough depth. And after trading Tarik Skubal and Casey Mize, Harris has willingly placed enormous pressure on the prospects and organizational depth acquired in return.

Hinch should be evaluated too but look at what he has done with this roster the past two seasons. If he was let go, teams would line up to hire him. Bet on that. 

Managers are responsible for decisions, clubhouse direction, player usage and ultimately helping extract wins from the roster they are given. Injuries in May, also seem to be forgotten, but I digress. 

Hinch managed Detroit back to October after a decade-long absence and then returned the Tigers to the postseason again the following year. Calling for his firing during the first significant step backward after that run strikes me as an emotional reaction rather than a serious evaluation of his tenure and yes, I was aware of the second half collapse last season. 

The same goes for Harris. The discussion should not be whether he has been flawless. He hasn't.The discussion should be whether the organization is healthier than it was when he arrived, and whether he can now complete the job.

The evidence strongly supports the first part. The second part remains unresolved. And that is exactly where the pressure belongs, instead of empty clicks for rage bait. Informing the audience goes a long way.